A Woman’s Obligation in Birkas Hamazon
The Mishnah (Berachos 20b) states that women are obligated in Birkas Hamazon. The Gemara (ibid.) questions whether their obligation is one that is min haTorah, or is only rabbinically required. Now, the reason why a woman would be obligated min haTorah is clear; on the contrary, there is ostensibly no reason why she should not be required in the mitzvah, for Birkas Hamazon is not a mitzvas asei shehazman gerama, from which women are exempt. What is the rationale behind the possibility that, min haTorah, she should be exempt from the mitzvah? One reason given in the Rishonim139 is that her exemption is understood from the way the Torah commands the mitzvah of Birkas Hamazon. The pasuk says, “You shall eat, you shall become satiated, and you shall bless Hashem, your God, for the good land that He has given you”; the Torah’s associating Birkas Hamazon with Eretz Yisrael teaches us that only those who received a portion in Eretz Yisrael – that is, men – are obligated in Birkas Hamazon. Others140 say that a woman’s Biblical exemption is based on the requirement that Birkas Hamazon (in the berachah of Birkas Ha’aretz) includes mention of the principles of Bris and Torah, principles which are not relevant to women. The fact that a woman cannot be commanded to fulfill the mitzvah in its full form indicates that she is exempt entirely.
The Gemara’s answer to this question is unclear, and is the subject of dispute among the Rishonim. Some141 understand that the Gemara concludes that women are obligated min haTorah. Others142 understand that the Gemara’s final ruling is that women are only rabbinically obligated. Finally, a middle view143 maintains that the Gemara indeed leaves the question unanswered, meaning that the question of a woman’s level of obligation is a practical one as well. Shulchan Aruch144 rules according to this final view.
Assuming that the level of a woman’s obligation remains uncertain, the following question arises. A man (who eats to the point of satiation) is certainly obligated to bentch, min haTorah. This being the case, one who does not remember whether or not he bentched following his meal must, based on the principle of safeik de’oraisa lechumra (an uncertainty in Biblical obligation requires one to act stringently), bentch for what is a possible second time, to ensure that his obligation has been fulfilled.145 Now, what is the halachah regarding a woman? Must she too bentch a possible second time to certainly fulfill her obligation? If her Birkas Hamazon obligation is min haTorah, she must, but if her obligation is merely rabbinic, the principle of safeik derabanan lekula (an uncertainty regarding rabbinic law is treated leniently) states that she need not bentch after she quite possibly already did so.
Now, perhaps the fact that the level of her obligation is uncertain would exempt her from bentching “again” in this case, based on a sfek sfeika (double uncertainty), namely, that min haTorah she may be exempt from the mitzvah, and, even if she is indeed obligated, perhaps she in truth already bentched. Having established that on a Biblical level the woman is no longer obligated to bentch, the woman’s certain rabbinic obligation will also not obligate her, as safeik derabanan lekula states that she need not bentch a possible second time.146
However, one can argue that this application of sfek sfeika is invalid because its first step – the fact that perhaps she is Biblically exempt from the mitzvah in the first place can play a role in deciding an eventual lenient ruling that she need not bentch in case of uncertainty – is based on flawed reasoning. For, even if a woman indeed has no Torah obligation to bentch, she is certainly obligated to do so miderabanan. The fact that she may be exempt min haTorah thus cannot provide grounds to create a sfek sfeika that will exempt her from bentching, practically.147 Another reason to obligate a woman to bentch “again” in this circumstance is that even if her essential obligation is indeed merely rabbinic, it stands to reason that Chazal rabbinically obligated her to fulfill the obligation that others have min haTorah. Since in a situation of uncertainty a man must bentch (on a de’oraisa level), a woman would be similarly obligated to do so, rabbinically.148
The Poskim have several positions of what should be done practically in this scenario:
Some rule that although many hold that a woman need not bentch “again,” one who wishes to discharge her possible obligation and bentch may do so.149
Others rule that although strictly speaking a woman is exempt from bentching, she should, if possible, eat another kezayis of bread150 and in this way create a definite obligation to bentch, thereby discharging any possible obligation to bentch following her original meal. Or, she should discharge her possible obligation by listening to another person bentch following their own meal, having in mind to discharge her of her possible obligation as well.151
It is proper to rule that the woman should bentch “again.” This will dispel the perception that a woman’s obligation in Birkas Hamazon is uncertain.152
139 Rashi, ד"ה או דרבנן.
140 Tosafos, ד"ה נשים.
141 Rif, as explained by Ramban (Milchemes Hashem, Berachos 11b (Rif folio); Rashba, Berachos 20b, ד"ה ולענין; Behag, as explained by Beiur Halachah, ד"ה אלא.
142 Rabbeinu Yonah, Berachos 11b (Rif folio). For explanation of this view see Gilyon Alfes.
143 Rambam, Berachos 5:1; Rosh, Berachos 3:13.
144 186:1.
145 Shulchan Aruch 184:4 with Mishnah Berurah, note 15.
146 Hagahos R’ Akiva Eiger 186:1; Birkei Yosef, cited in Mishnah Berurah 186:3.
147 Sha’ar Ephraim 11; see also Chayei Adam 47:2 for another reason why the woman in our case would remain obligated to bentch.
148 Tzelach, Berachos 20b, ד"ה ולולי דמסתפינא .
149 Mishnah Berurah 186:3, based on the reasoning set forth in Beiur Halachah, ד"ה אלא.
150 Washing and reciting Hamotzi before doing so (based on Mishnah Berurah 184:15).
151 Kaf Hachaim 184:25.
152 R’ S. Z. Auerbach (cited in Vesein Berachah, p. 13). He similarly rules that a minor who is uncertain whether he bentched should also bentch “again.” Although the minor’s obligation is certainly rabbinic, he must be educated to do what he would one day do as an adult.