Car Accidents

The Talmud discusses a case in which someone carrying a barrel was walking behind someone carrying a beam. The one carrying the beam suddenly stopped in his tracks, without warning, causing the one with the barrel to smash into him. The Talmud rules that the one carrying the beam is liable for the damage caused to the barrel because he stopped short.[1] The halacha is in accordance with this view.[2]

It is noted, however, that this is true only if the one carrying the beam stopped without any warning. If, however, he gave reasonable notice or warning that he was about to stop, then he would not be liable for the damage caused to the barrel. So too, if the one carrying the beam stopped for good reason, or for reasons beyond his control, he would also not be liable for any damage to the barrel.

The halachic authorities cite the above Talmudic passage as the basis for arbitrating car accidents.[3] Car accidents are often caused by a lead car stopping unexpectedly, causing the car behind to crash into it, and damaging both vehicles. It seems from the Talmud that a driver who stops short would be responsible to pay for the damages to the car that crashes into his car, along with the damages to his own car, of course. This is based on the principle that the car, or any damaging object for that matter, is an “extension of a person." Just as one is responsible for all damages that one causes directly, so too, one is responsible for damages caused by a secondary force or object that is a direct result of one's actions.

There is some discussion, however, whether a car that is no longer in motion is still deemed to be an extension of a person. This is true even if the damage occurs mere milliseconds after the car has stopped.[4] If the now stopped car is not deemed to be an extension of a person, then the one who stopped short (thereby causing the accident) would only be required to pay for injuries caused to people. He would not be liable for damages caused to property or possessions, such as the car that was forced to crash into him. This is because one who is responsible for damages caused by a “bor" -- a hazardous item left in a public place that can cause damage -- is only required to pay for injuries caused to people, not for damages caused to their possessions.[5]

That being said, it must be noted that the Talmud teaches that a person is liable for all of his actions, whether accidental or intentional.[6] This would certainly include unsafe driving habits. Indeed, one who causes a car accident as a result of having violated traffic laws will always be at fault from the perspective of halacha.[7] Following too closely is an example of unsafe driving that would make that person liable for damages incurred. It goes without saying that speeding and reckless driving are included, as well.[8] It might just be that if both drivers are equally at fault, then neither of them would be required, according to halacha, to pay damages to the other.[9] Nevertheless, secular law is generally followed in all such situations.

It is interesting to note that insurance coverage does not necessarily exempt the damager from paying for damage caused. In fact, the damaged party cannot be obligated to make a claim from his insurance company in order to exempt the damager from paying compensation. Instead, the damaged party can choose to seek damages directly from the damager. Furthermore, once the damager has paid him, the damaged party is even entitled to submit a claim to his insurance company (if the insurance policy allows doing so) and he has no obligation to return any compensation to the damager.[10] Some authorities rule that even when an insurance claim is paid, the damaged party can seek to have the damager pay the increase in insurance premiums that he will suffer as a result of the claim.

[1] Bava Kamma 31b.

[2] CM 379:2.

[3] Pitchei Choshen, Nezikin Chapter 1 footnote 79.

[4] Pitchei Choshen, Nezikin Chapter 1 footnote 79.

[5] CM 410:21.

[6] Bava Kamma 26a.

[7] Chatam Sofer, CM 44.

[8] See CM 378:8.

[9] Rambam, Hilchot Chovel U'mazik 6:3,9.

[10] Or Same’ach, Sechirut 7; Minchat Yitzchak 2:88 as explained in Pure Money Vol. II p.287.